United States v. Hamber, 2025 WL 397114 (8th Cir. 2025)
In Jennings, Missouri, Officer William Ware was dispatched to a gas station to check on a pickup truck that had been idling for over two hours next to a pump. The gas station was closed for the night, and happened to be in an area known for “heavy narcotic use.” Using a flashlight to look into the truck, Officer Ware saw Charles Hamber “passed out” in the driver’s seat. The officer knocked on the window, and Hamber awoke and identified himself. Ware told Hamber to turn off the truck, after which he questioned the man. Hamber said he had fallen asleep because he had been “working all day, since 5:30 in the morning.” When Ware asked whether there were any guns in the car, Hamber said no. Hamber gave the officer his driver’s license and Ware went back to his car to run a license check.
The officer learned Hamber was likely a convicted felon. He walked back to Hamber’s truck and asked him to step out of the vehicle “to see whether he was able to drive or not.” Ware directed him to the back of the truck and asked if Hamber had any weapons on him. Hamber said he had a knife. Ware asked, “o you mind if I search you then real quick?” Hamber answered, “o what you gotta do.” When the officer frisked Hamber, he found the knife and a loaded handgun. Officer Ware handcuffed the man. After confirming with dispatch that Hamber was a convicted felon, Ware arrested Hamber.
Hamber moved to suppress the pistol, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful stop and search. The trial court found Officer Ware had reasonable suspicion to search Hamber and that Hamber had voluntarily consented to the search. After a jury convicted Hamber of being a felon in possession of a firearm, Hamber appealed.
Hamber did not contest either the lawfulness of the initial stop or the voluntary nature of his consent to the search. Rather, he claimed the officer unlawfully extended the stop after determining Hamber’s license was valid. In Rodriguez v. United States (575 U.S. 348 (2015)), the Supreme Court held “a constitutionally permissible traffic stop becomes unlawful when its length exceeds the time needed to attend to the stop’s mission and related safety concerns.” However, the Court further held that officers do not impermissibly extend a stop by taking actions to “ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” The Court listed examples of such actions as checking vehicle registration and insurance, checking the occupants’ names and criminal histories, issuing citations and asking routine questions.
The court of appeals held Officer Ware had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to ensure Hamber was fit to drive, given the circumstances of finding him asleep at the wheel in an area known for heavy narcotic use. The court opined it was objectively reasonable for the officer to ask Hamber to step out of the vehicle to confirm the man was not under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and that he could safely drive and not injure a member of the public in doing so.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court laid down a bright-line rule that an officer may always require a driver to get out of a lawfully stopped vehicle (Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)). The Court balanced the privacy interests of the driver and the safety interests of the officer in reaching this conclusion. The officer need not state any particular suspicion or fear to require the driver to get out of the vehicle. Twenty years later, the Court extended its ruling to all passengers in a lawfully stopped car in Maryland v. Wilson (519 U.S. 408 (1997)).
In Hamber’s case, the appellate court said the stop did not end until after Hamber consented to the search and the pistol was found. Thus, the evidence was properly admitted, and Hamber’s conviction stands.
