Warrantless Entry and Dog Bite Leads to Liability for Deputies

by | March 24, 2025

Luethje v. Kyle, 2025 WL 851085 (10th Cir. 2025)

Though this is a case police service dog handlers should study carefully, it is also an excellent paint-by-the-numbers lesson on when warrantless entry may be lawful under the emergency aid doctrine. All officers can benefit from the reminder of the simple — but essential — elements necessary to justify a lawful warrantless entry and thereby avoid violating the Fourth Amendment.

Early on a February evening in Castle Rock, Colorado, Tyler Luethje’s neighbor called 911 and reported seeing a man break the front window of Luethje’s home and then run away without entering. When Deputies Travis Kyle and Scott Kelly arrived, they saw a broken window and “heard someone speaking from inside the house,” but did not hear any sound of a struggle or call for help. A deputy removed the screen and broke out the rest of the glass. He then lifted Sig, his unleashed police service dog, through the window in hopes of locating the suspected burglar.

Sig found Luethje sleeping in his bed and bit his arm, hand and abdomen. Deputies entered and Luethje screamed, “I live here! I live here! I live here!” Hearing Luethje’s screams, Deputy Kyle yelled, “Bring my dog to me!” The two deputies then entered Luethje’s home through the window and found Luethje in his bedroom. The deputies questioned Luethje while Sig continued to bite him. Luethje said he was home alone, and that he had broken his own window. After approximately one minute, Deputy Kyle called off the dog.

The deputies continued to question Luethje. They handcuffed him and walked him out into the “freezing” February night wearing sweatpants but no shirt, shoes or socks. Shortly thereafter, Luethje was taken to the hospital to be treated for dog bites. After Luethje was transported to the hospital, the deputies entered the home a second time to conduct “a thorough search.” They didn’t find anyone else there or evidence of any crime.

This decision bluntly reminds officers to pause and question the legal basis for entering a home without a warrant.

Luethje was treated and released without charges. He sued, alleging unlawful entry and search of his home, false arrest and excessive force.

The trial court refused to grant qualified immunity to the deputies, ruling Kyle and Kelly violated clearly established Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful entry and search, false arrest and excessive force. The trial court found the deputies sent Sig into Luethje’s home to find and bite him “without any warning (or, at most, approximately a six-second warning).” Though the deputies claimed to have given an audible warning before sending the K9 through the window, there were no warnings heard on the recording submitted in evidence.

On appeal, the 10th Circuit agreed the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. In its ruling, the court held the deputies’ warrantless entries were each unlawful. The panel also found law enforcement did not have probable cause for the arrest and that allowing the canine to continue biting Luethje after he was subdued constituted excessive force.

In Florida v. Jardines (569 U.S. 1 (2013)), the Supreme Court held, “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Among the few exceptions allowing warrantless entry into a home is the emergency aid doctrine, which allows officers to enter a home without a warrant where “(1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable” (United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2006)).

In the same vein, SCOTUS has also held that “Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed” (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).

The appellate court held the deputies did not have an objectively reasonable belief in an ongoing emergency. The only information they had upon arrival at Luethje’s house was that an unidentified man had broken a window and fled the scene. There was no indication the man had entered the home. The deputies conducted no investigation beyond confirming the window was broken and perhaps hearing a voice inside before sending Sig through the window. The court also held that “the deputies’ argument they ‘reasonably believed’ there was a suspect inside who was ‘reluctant to talk to the police’ stretches the facts alleged beyond recognition.” Indeed, the court’s sharp criticism was based on the lack of evidence that the deputies called out to the person inside or made any police service dog warnings before lifting Sig through the window. The fact that no verbal warning can be heard on the audio recording in evidence reinforces this position.

The court also held the second warrantless entry and search was plainly unlawful. The deputies could not claim they had the homeowner’s (Luethje’s) permission. Nor could the search — stated to be “thorough” — reasonably be construed as a protective sweep.

Next, the court held Luethje was arrested without probable cause. All parties agreed Luethje was arrested as of the moment that Sig bit him. The deputies argued they had probable cause to arrest the man for criminal mischief (i.e., for breaking his own window). As the court noted, though, the caller had reported that the man who broke the window ran from the scene. Therefore, it was not reasonable to believe the person who broke the window would be inside Luethje’s home. Nor was it reasonable for the deputies to assume the first person Sig found and bit inside the home was necessarily the person who broke the window. As the deputies’ attorney acknowledged in oral argument, a five-year-old child might well have been the first person found by the dog. The court observed the deputies’ failure to do “some basic investigation — such as making announcements and seeing if anyone came to the door — that could dispel any suspicion that a crime was underway” undermined finding probable cause to arrest. Upon review, the panel concluded there was no arguable probable cause to arrest and thus the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, the force used to arrest Luethje was unreasonable. Applying the three-factor test of Graham v. Connor, (490 U.S. 386 (1989)), the court held the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Graham factors consider: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

The deputies argued the first factor weighed in their favor because they believed Luethje was committing a burglary. The court agreed. However, the second and third factors weighed strongly in Luethje’s favor. Noting the second factor is “undoubtedly the most important,” the court held, “under the facts alleged in the complaint, there was no indication that Luethje posed any threat to the deputies at the moment they deployed force.” The deputies conceded they perceived no threat to themselves, but argued that persons inside the home could have been threatened. The court countered: “A broken window and suspicion of a burglary, without more, does not generate a reasonable belief a third party is in immediate danger.”

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The third Graham factor also weighed heavily in Luethje’s favor because there was no indication he was “actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” The court also discussed the duration of Sig’s biting once deputies located Luethje. The fact that they continued to question him for approximately one minute, rather than remove Sig and restrain Luethje, seems to have been a major consideration.

This decision bluntly reminds officers to pause and question the legal basis for entering a home without a warrant. No Fourth Amendment incursion is more closely scrutinized by the courts. The Luethje v. Kyle case should serve as a reminder of how narrowly the emergency exception doctrine applies. Significant lessons specifically for police service dog handlers include providing loud, clear warnings (and ensuring that the warnings are well documented), and allowing time for carefully listening for a response and providing an opportunity for compliance. Handlers should also be mindful to end the bite and secure the subject as soon as reasonably possible, holding questions about identification, etc., until after the handcuffs are on and the subject is controlled.

KEN WALLENTINE is police chief of the West Jordan (Utah) Police Department and former chief of law enforcement for the Utah attorney general. He has served over three decades in public safety, is a legal expert and editor of Xiphos, a monthly national criminal procedure newsletter. Wallentine is a member of the board of directors of the Institute for the Prevention of In-Custody Death and serves as a use of force consultant in state and federal criminal and civil litigation across the nation.

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